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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

I
Case No.
10854

vs.
NEUMAN C. PETTY and IREVA
G. PETTY, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT FOR REASON
FOR REPLY BRIEF
The appellant submits the following reply brief
to further clarify the issues between the parties and to
bring to the court's attention precedent discovered subsequent to the filing of the original brief.
1
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POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OR.
DERING APPELLANT TO ANSWER RE.
SPONDENTS' INTERROGATORIES WITH
GREATER PARTICULARITY.

The respondents have cited in their brief federal
authority and a decision from the Supreme Court of
California to the effect that discovery of the appellant's '
appraiser valuations of the property being taken by
the appellant is proper. In answer to the federal autho;.
ities, it should be noted that there is federal authori~
cited in the appellant's brief which is contrary to the
cases cited in the respondents' brief. However, apart
from the split in the federal rule, it should be noted
that Rule 30 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
departs from the federal rule by providing that the
court "shall not order the production or inspection of
any writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party,
his attorney, surety, or agent in anticipation of litigation
or in the preparation for trial, unless satisfied the denial
of production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the
t"ion. ***" Con·
· or mspec
·
party seeking the prod ucbon
1
sequently, the federal cases cited by the respondents
are unrelated to the specific language applicable under
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, in the
Compilers' Notes, Rule 30 (b), Utah Rules of Ciril
Procedure (Vol. 9, p. 559, Utah Code Annotated,
1953), it is noted:
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"*** In its report, the Committee, after discussing the various cases which had determined
that writings obtained or prepared by a party,
his attorneys, agents or insurers in anticipation
of litigation or in preparation for trial were subject to discovery and other cases to the effect
that such matter was privileged, concluded that
an amendment to Rule 30 (b) was desirable. The
amendment 'while placing the burden on the
person seeking the discovery of the writing to
demonstrate the necessity therefor, states a test
of whether denial of the production or inspection
sought by the party "will unfairly prejudice"
him in "preparing his claim or defense" or will
cause him "undue hardship or injustice." This
gives the court a guide in determining whether
tnquiry may justly be made. Tests such as
whether the examination constitutes a "fishing
expedition," "penalizes the diligent," puts a
"premium on laziness," or is subject to a broad
rule of privilege protecting all matter gathered
or prepared by or for an attorney, are rejected.
A client's privilege of free communication with
his attorney is protected in that production or
inspection is not permitted as to any part of a
writing reflecting the attorney's legal thinkingthat is, his "mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories." Parties who have
retained expert witnesses at their own expense
are also protected***." (Emphasis added.)
The appellant's position is that the discovery should
not be allowed on four grounds: (I) attorney-client
privilege, (2) work product of the attorney, (3) unfairness, and (4) the interrogatories in part sought legal
conclusions from the State. None of the cases cited
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by the respondent. co.ver the work product issue under
rules or statutes sumlar to that existing in Utah
.
.
, nor
do they consider the question of the legal conclusionarr
status of the request for information. Respondent seeks
to rely upon Oceanside Union School District of San
Diego County v. Superior Court of San Diego County,
23 Cal. Rep. 37 5, 373 P .2d 439 ( 1962). That case considered only the attorney-client privilege and did not
consider the work product argument. Further, the
California Code of Civil Procedure does not contain
provisions similar to Rule 30 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. It is submitted that the better-reasoned
approach is that contained in Rust v. Roberts, 171 Cal.
App.2d 772, 341 P.2d 46 (1959).
The same issue now before the court was before the
Oregon Supreme Court in Brink v. Multnomah County,
224 Ore. 507, 356 P .2d 536 ( 1960) . There, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege
prohibited discovery of an appraiser employed by the
condemnor. The court also indicated:

"It is possible that plaintiffs' demand for the
information contained in its report could have
been resisted by defendant's counsel on th~
ground that it was a part of his '":ork-p~oduct
arising out of his preparation for trial. Hickman
v. Taylor, 1947, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, ~I
L.Ed. 451, instructive opinion below reported ID
a Cir., 1945, 153 F.2d 212, 223; Sparks C~ ~·
Huber Baking Co., 1955, IO Terry .267, 49 ~o
267, II4 A.2d 657; McCormick, Evidence,~ 1
(1954)."
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The Oregon Supreme Court applied the attorney-client
privilege, citing McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F.Supp. 585
(D.C.E.D.N.Y. 1939), that to make use of such preparation would be to "penalize the diligent and place a
premium on laziness." The court also noted a similar
result in the case of Lewis v. United Airlines Transport
Corporation, 32 F. Supp. 21 (D.C.W.D. Penn. 1940).
In State Highway Department v. 62.96747 Acres
of Land, 193 A.2d 799 (Del. 1963), the Delaware court
ruled that a party could not use the expert appraisers
of the State or discover their testimony. In doing so,
the court thoroughly considered precedent from California. The court noted that it was difficult to reconcile
the decisions of the California Supreme Court. It further
noted that there was substantial inaccuracy in much of
the legal research of the California Court, and inconsistency among the California authorities. The Delaware
court approved the opinion of the Oregon Supreme
Court noted above, rejected the California authorities,
and indicated that the attorney-client privilege was applicable to appraisers hired by the State Highway
Department.
It is apparent that the better rule is to recognize

that experts expressly employed by the Utah State
Department of Highways are employed for the purpose
of litigation, and appraisals are communicated to the
State's attorneys for the sole purpose of litigation. By
keeping the appraisals of the parties to themselves,
justice is served, and settlement of suits is encouraged,
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since a party not knowing the State's appraisals will
not be in a position to shop for higher appraisals, but
will be forced to make an objective appraisal of his
position based on his own determination of value. If
discovery were allowed, it would produce "appraiser
shopping." A party would be inclined to discover the
State's appraisals and then seek out higher appraisals
merely for the purpose of claiming a greater damage.
The traditional condemnation practice has been to exclude discovery, and it does not appear to have prejudiced the community. In the case of a clear showing
that the condemnee would be prejudiced, a court might,
in its discretion, allow some discovery, but blanket discovery which was sought in this case and which. in part,
called for the legal conclusions of the State is improper. ~

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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